that "the scope of the inspection.
bear an appropriate relationship to the violations alleged in the complaint." 15 This comment argues that warrants for complaint inspections may authorize investigation only of employees' specific complaints. The language and structure of the Act so restricts OSHA's investigatory powers. Moreover, the fourth amendment requires a greater showing of probability that a violation exists for complaint inspections than for neutral programmed inspections; complaint searches therefore must be confined to those areas for which employee complaints provide this higher level of probability.
I. STATUTORY LIMrrs ON SCOPE
The Secretary of Labor derives his authority to inspect worksites from section 8 of the Act. 16 Programmed inspections are authorized by the "extremely general"1 7 section 8(a), which provides for entry into "any. . .workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer." 18 These inspections the steel yard. Id. at 321 & n.1. The company offered to admit the OSHA compliance officers without a warrant if they confined their search to the areas complained of. Instead, the inspectors returned with a wall-to-wall warrant.
[They] did not inspect those areas set forth in the complaint and evidenced no intention of inspecting the same with any immediacy but rather inspected whatever portions of the plant they desired to inspect even after being informed by North American Car officials that their inspections would not be permitted after a certain date. 476 F. Supp. at 707. After several days of inspection, the company refused to permit the compliance officers to reenter. OSHA sought to have North American found in contempt, filing citations that called for penalties of $36,500 for violations observed in areas not complained of. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 7, Marshall v. North Am. Car. Co., 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980) . Is 626 F.2d at 324. The district court found the warrant to be unconstitutionally overbroad. 476 F. Supp. at 706. The Third Circuit did not reach the constitutional issue, affirming instead on statutory grounds. 626 F.2d at 323. Because the Secretary's argument on appeal was that "a wall-to-wall search is permissible in any case where OSHA has received an employee complaint," id. at 322 (emphasis in original), the court did not "decide the exact relationship that must exist" between the allegations in the complaint and the scope of the search warrant, id. at 324.
Is 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1976). 17 Rothstein, OSHA Inspections after Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DuKe L.J. 63, 83.
Is 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). This section authorizes representatives of the Secretary of Labor
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and (2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, If Congress had intended employee complaints to prompt thoroughgoing section 8(a) inspections, it need only have provided that upon receipt of a complaint, the Secretary would make an inspection. Yet section 8(f) labels the complaint inspection a "special inspection," 20 suggesting that such searches have a distinct character. 21 The thrice-repeated phrase "such violation or danger" in section 8(f) 22 indicates that the Secretary may do no more than "conduct an inspection of the condition" alleged by the employee. 2 Nothing in section 8(f) either invites or authorizes the Secretary to determine if other, unmentioned violations can be found on the 24 premises. The complaint procedure is designed to determine the existence vel non of a particular hazard, and the Secretary may go operator, agent or employee. The scope of a section 8(a) inspection is not as unlimited as this language suggests. See note 34 infra.
29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1976). The section provides that:
(1) Any employees or representative of employees.who believe that a violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary or his authorized representative of such violation or danger . . . If upon receipt of such notification the Secretary determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, he shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as soon as practicable, to determine if such violation or danger exists. 20 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976). S1 To deny that "special" restricts the scope of complaint warrants, as does Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1326 (7th Cir. 1980 (Sprecher, J.) , is to ignore the legislative mandate not to "convert every § 8(f) inspection into a § 8(a) wallto-wall inspection." Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d 320, 323 (3d Cir. 1980) (a special inspection is one limited to investigation of the violation alleged in the complaint). 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [49:203 no further than necessary to make that determination. 2 5 The legislative history of section. 8(f) supports this narrow reading. Congress did not create the complaint inspection procedure without concern for its abuse. 2 " Members recognized the potential for false and malicious complaints and made clear their intention that the Secretary "not permit this procedure to be used as an harassment device. 2 1 7 The debates were rife with expressions of distrust of inspectors' judgments in the field. 28 Numerous safeguards were built into the statute to avoid groundless complaint inspections. 29 Conscious of the disruptions caused by OSHA in- REc. 42,203 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Daniels) (House conferees "cognizant of the concern of [their colleagues] over arbitrary action by inspectors"). The coauthor of the House bill criticized another proposal as "giv[ing] the inspectors dictatorial powers," id. at 38,704 (remarks of Rep. Sikes), commenting that "we have human frailties in all walks of life. This includes inspectors who would be employed in this program," id. See also id. at 38,382 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn) (concern about "subjective judgment" of inspectors); id. at 38,386 (remarks of Rep. Dent) (fearing "injudicious decision by some inspector who reads the letter of the law and does not have brains enough to interpret it"); id. at 38,393 (remarks of Rep. Michel) (proposed bill puts "unreasonable power and authority in the hands of inspectors, many of whom might be incompetent or easily influenced"); id. at 38,377-78 (remarks of Rep. Daniels); id. at 38,702 (remarks of Rep. Steiger) (care taken to avoid giving inspectors excessive powers). These concerns were prophetic. See note 106 infra.
29 Section 8(f)(1) requires that the complaint be from an "employee or representative of employees," be in writing and signed, and set forth with "reasonable particularity" either a violation of a standard threatening "significant" physical harm, see 116 CONG. REC. 42,207 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Steiger), or an imminent danger. The employee must have a "good faith" belief that the alleged violation or danger exists, see id., and the Secretary must find "reasonable grounds" to believe that the alleged violation or danger exists, see S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 5177, 5224 (individual views of Sen. Javits) (reasonable grounds requirement added to "ensure that inspections are not required in response to groundless complaints").
spections, s0 Congress required that inspections be carried out "with a minimum burden upon employers." 3 1 These concerns are best met by restricting complaint inspections to investigation of the specific violations alleged. The Secretary of Labor has attempted to circumvent the restrictions on scope of section 8(f) by asserting that the broad language of section 8(a) 3 defines the extent of his authority to conduct not only programmed inspections, but complaint inspections as well. 34 According to the Secretary, the clause in section 8(f) that 3' Even absent official or employee abuse, the burdens placed on employers by OSHA searches are considerable: Inspections of entire plants-referred to as "wall to wall" in agency jargon-frequently extend over several weeks. 34 Even this section imposes limits on the scope of OSHA investigations, however. Although it has been carelessly claimed that the section "authorizes an inspection of the employer's entire workplace, " Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1326 (7th Cir. 1980 (Sprecher, J.) , section 8(a)(2) confines the scope of investigations "within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner" to "pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (1976). The conditions "pertinent" to a search and the areas within its "reasonable" limits vary with the purpose of the search. For example, a woodworking shop located in the same facility as a foundry is not pertinent to or within the reasonable limits of a programmed foundry inspection. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903 See 29 C.F.R. § .2(b) (1981 ("[w] here distinctly separate activities are performed at a single physical location... each activity shall be treated as a separate physical establishment"). Therefore, even if complaint inspections are limited in scope only by section 8(a)(2), the Secretary exceeds the limits of his inspection authority if he ignores the purpose for entry-investigation of the complaint-by extending his search to areas not
requires complaint inspections to be carried out "in accordance with the provisions of this section 3 5 refers to the expansive scope of section 8(a)( 2 ).s" It would be odd, however, if this cross-reference was intended to override the explicit limits on scope set forth in section 8(f) itself. The sounder construction is to read the "in accordance with" language as supplementing rather than superseding the requirements of section 8(f). Other provisions in section 8 undeniably regulate the numerous aspects of inspections on which section 8(f) is silent.
3 7 Complaint inspections must be "in accordance with" these provisions, but they also must be faithful to the "such violation or danger" restriction imposed by section 8(f).
The Secretary has argued that section 8(a) nevertheless governs complaint inspections because it contains the Act's sole grant of inspection authority. 320 (3d Cir. 1980) . This view was adopted in Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1326 (7th Cir. 1980 ) (Sprecher, J.) ("The only part of section 8 which arguably pertains to the scope of inspection is section 8(a) (2) ."). See also Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1977 ) (dicta), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978 . 37 For example, the inspector may investigate only places of employment, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976), must present his credentials, id. § 657(a)(1), may inspect only at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner, id. § 657(a) (2) , and must obtain information with a minimum burden on the employer, id. § 657(d). He may conduct interviews, id. § 657(a) (2) , and subpoena witnesses, id. § 657(b). Representatives of both the employer and employees may accompany the inspector. Id. § 657(e).
38 See Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1321 , 1326 (7th Cir. 1980 
OSHA Complaint Inspections
This effort to transform section 8(a) into a license to conduct wall-to-wall inspections in response to specific section 8(f) complaints is unconvincing. Whatever the source of the Secretary's inspection authority, section 8(f) inescapably limits it in the complaint context. 40 Moreover, the structure and legislative history of the section do not support the duty/authority distinction advanced by the Secretary, demonstrating instead that section 8(f) creates an independent investigatory mechanism whose goals are distinct from those of the general inspection program embodied in section 8(a).
The Act's sponsors, concerned that employees be protected from imminent threats to safety, originally included a provision allowing employees to refuse to work around toxic substances. 1 Branded a "strike with pay" provision, the proposal was dropped by the Senate committee in favor of a general employee complaint provision. 4 2 Proponents asserted that the complaint inspection pro- These claims would not have been worth raising if, as the Secretary asserts, section 8(a) already had given the Secretary power to act on employee complaints. Although some increased compliance might result solely from the imposition of a duty on the Secretary, 45 it is the information generated by this complaint mechanism that provides the truly substantial boost to enforcement of the Act. 4 6 Thus, Congress envisioned section 8(f) as a special inspection mechanism that "enables employees subject to a risk of harm to get the Secretary into the situation quickly. ' REc. 37,340 (1970) . Section 8(f) in effect creates an army of unpaid inspectors whose complaints can focus inspection efforts efficiently and whose presence deters violations of the Act by employers.
47 116 CONG. REc. 38,378 (1970) On the face of it, it looks like this is a very good provision because it gives the man an opportunity to identify a safety hazard and to know that there will be a response, because it is also required that if they feel that imminent danger is present, they have to make this inspection. tine inspections for which wall-to-wall search warrants may be issued on a "showing that specified businesses had been chosen . . .on the basis of a general administrative plan... derived from neutral sources.' 49 Section 8(f) complaint inspections possess none of these characteristics; rather, as the Court noted in dicta, they are based on "specific evidence of an existing violation." 50 It is not surprising that lower courts applying this construction have rejected the Secretary's attempts to characterize complaint inspections as neutral section 8(a) searches. 51 The plain words of the Act, its legislative history, and the weight of judicial construction all support the conclusion that section 8(f) alone defines the Secretary's authority to carry out complaint inspections, confining such searches to investigation of the violations or dangers alleged by the employee.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON SCOPE
The scope of an OSHA complaint inspection is also limited by the fourth amendment. 52 In the criminal context, the amendment requires warrants to be confined in scope to the showing of probable cause-In extending the fourth amendment's protections to rou- In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) , the Supreme Court held that the deletion of the "strike-with-pay" provision, see text and notes at notes 41-42 supra, did not deprive employees of the right to absent themselves from hazardous worksites without pay. In finding that such an implicit right "conforms to the fundamental objective of the Act," id. at 11, the Court described section 8(f)(1) as an "express mechanism for protecting workers" that gives them "the right to inform OSHA of an imminently dangerous workplace condition or practice and request that OSHA inspect that condition or practice," id. at 8-9. This language reinforces the view that section 8(f) is an independent inspection mechanism. 1615 -16 (OSHRC 1981 . The persistent failure of the Secretary to develop a neutral plan for investigation of employee complaints reinforces the fundamental differences between programmed and complaint inspections. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. tine health and safety inspections, the Supreme Court created an "administrative warrant" that issues on less than traditional probable cause. 53 This warrant, which is required for all nonconsensual OSHA searches, 5 4 is the product of the rebalancing of the opposing interests implicated by any official search. The breadth of routine programmed inspections is the result of the lower level of probability permitted by this rebalancing. The balance that permits wall-to-wall routine inspections cannot be extended, however, to the more intrusive complaint inspections, for which a higher level of probability, and therefore stricter limits on scope, are required.
A. Traditional Probable Cause
A primary purpose of the warrant requirement is that "those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. ' 55 Procedurally, this goal is achieved by requiring particular description of the object of the search" and review by a magistrate.
57 Substan- tively, it is achieved by the probable cause requirement, which ensures that there exists "a substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search will be justified by discovery of offending items." 1 8 Because a search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the exigencies underlying it, only those areas may be searched for which the necessary quantum of probable cause has been shown."' For criminal searches, the required level of probability is high; 6 0 this strict standard sharply limits in number and area the places for which a warrant may issue.
B. Probable Cause in Administrative Searches
In ; see Comment, supra note 57, at 687 (probable cause requires "substantial evidence ... that the items will be found in the place to be searched") (footnote omitted).
"0 Probable cause in the criminal context requires that the government's agents have "facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that evidence of an offense would be found in the place alleged. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) . When an officer relies on information from a complainant, "the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which... the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed .... was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (citation and footnote omitted). The reliability of the information must be scrutinized even where corroboration exists. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969) .
' 387 U. S. 523, 534 (1967) . Camara involved an inspection of a rented building to determine if it was being used as a residence in violation of the housing code.
42 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) . See involved a routine fire code inspection of a commercial warehouse.
'3 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank, the Court upheld the imposition of a fine against a homeowner who had refused to admit a health inspector without a warrant, noting that warrantless health and regulatory inspections had continued unabated after the enactment of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 367-70. The Court restricted the warrant requirement to searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions, reading the fourth amendment in light of the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination. When the search affected nothing more than "the right to be secure from intrusion into personal of probable cause necessary to obtain such administrative warrants. 6 4 1. The Camara Balancing Test. Asserting that the "ultimate standard" 5 of the fourth amendment is that of "unreasonable searches and seizures, ' 6 6 the Court in Camara held that the reaprivacy," id. at 365, the Court required only that it be carried out in a way that minimized that intrusion, id. at 371-73. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) .
The Court in Camara was concerned only marginally with the criminal penalty that might follow refusal to admit the inspectors, 387 U.S. at 527 n.2, emphasizing instead the civil sanctions for health and safety violations, id. at 531. The Court's language was broad: "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." Id. at 528-29. The Court thus purported to avoid the anomaly of having "the individual and his private property. . . fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id. at 530 & n.6; see LaFave, supra note 56, at 18. The Court's later emphasis on the underlying sanction, however, see text and notes at notes 71-72 infra, reintroduced the tensions between the view of the fourth amendment as protector of personal privacy and the view of the amendment as a procedural right against selfincrimination that, like the fifth amendment, comes increasingly into play as the underlying sanction becomes more severe. 78-85 (1979) .
" Determining that a warrant is required "must be the beginning, not the end of our inquiry." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) . This further inquiry into the nature of probable cause was considered necessary because "the unique character of these inspection programs" raised "the question whether some other accommodation between public need and individual rights is essential." Id.
65 Id. at 539. 66 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see note 52 supra. The relationship between the "unreasonable searches and seizures" clause and the "no Warrants shall issue" clause long has been a matter of dispute. Some have interpreted the clauses to mean that warrants are required to render searches reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Others have read them as creating two distinct constitutional protections: warrants for some searches, and reasonableness for all. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325-28 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the general contours of this debate, see LaFave, supra note 56, at 13 n.37; Comment, supra note 57, at 678-86.
Camara followed neither of these readings. Although it held that health and safety inspections are subject to the warrant clause, it did not find the meaning of reasonableness to be grounded in the traditional notions of probable cause embodied in the warrant clause. Instead, it held the reverse: that the content of the warrant clause is derived from the reasonableness clause. See 387 U.S. at 535 (probable cause exists when "a particular inspection is reasonable"). The textual and historical justifications for this construction are unclear. In so ruling, the Court employed the analysis of the case it overruled, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which held that periodic inspections were governed only by the reasonableness clause. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting). In Frank, Justice Frankfurter disputed the legitimacy of such a "synthetic search warrant," arguing that "[i]f a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue." sonableness of a search must be determined "by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. ' e 7 Probable cause was refashioned in terms of a "reasonable governmental interest": if "a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause." 68 Applying this test, the Court distinguished routine health and safety inspections from criminal searches. Although noting that such inspections can be as lengthy and physically intrusive as their criminal counterparts, 9 the Court argued that administrative searches involve a "relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. ' 7 0 Because health inspections are "neither personal 359 U.S. at 373.
17 387 U.S. at 537. One commentator has described the Camara balancing test in terms of the formula expounded by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) : probable cause exists and a search is constitutional if VP > C, where V is the value to the government and society of the item sought, P the probability that the item will be found, and C the cost of such official invasion to the persons searched. See Comment, supra note 63, at 78-85.
387 U.S. at 539 (1967). The novelty of Camara was not in recognizing that "[tihe Framers struck ... a balance" between the need to search and the right to be free from official intrusion. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976). Probable cause long has been recognized as the Constitution's compromise between these opposing interests. E.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). Camara's major departure from previous constitutional doctrine was in rebalancing, rather than relying on well-established standards of probable cause. See LaFave, supra note 56, at 12-13 & n.38. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979) (refusing to reevaluate the quantum of probable cause for police station questionings because "the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent").
By permitting searches on less than traditional probable cause, the Court thus gave its imprimatur to what until then had been unlawful: issuance on "loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact" of warrants authorizing "a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence of [violations] will be found," Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931). Thus the "overreaching" British Writs of Assistance that were "the immediate evil at which the Fourth Amendment was directed," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327-28 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), have been reintroduced under the guise of constitutional protections.
49 387 U.S. at 530. 70 Id. at 537. The Court also suggested two other factors distinguishing the level of probability "reasonable" for health and safety inspections from that required for criminal searches. First, it pointed to the "long history of judicial and public acceptance" of health inspections. Id. at 537. Even if accurate, such a "history of acquiescence," Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), should not justify a search without traditional probable cause any more than it justifies a search without a warrant. See LaFave, supra note 56, at 14. Second, the Court asserted that "the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results." 387 U.S. at 537. This assertion lacks logical and empirical support; moreover, it cannot be justified constitutionally: "Like notions obtain by some law enforcement officials who take shortcuts in pursuit of criminals. The same pattern appears over and again whenever government seeks to use its compulsive in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, 7' and because inspectors do not enter suspecting a violation, the inspections are "less hostile" than criminal searches. 7 2 Triggered by "neutral criteria" rather than human complaints, programmed inspections do not lend themselves to abuse by third parties, and they leave enforcement authorities unable to single out certain targets for repetitive or arbitrary searches. 7 3 Because the risks of official and third-party abuse are less in the programmed inspection context, the Court found that a legitimate balance of reasonableness can be struck at a level of probability lower than that required for criminal warrants.
This level of probability is provided by a legislative or administrative inspection plan addressing industry-wide hazards and providing for selection of particular premises for inspection based on neutral criteria such as "the passage of time, the nature of the building ... or the condition of the entire area. ' ' 7 4 Although not subject to easy definition, neutral criteria are distinguished from "specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. Camara found that probable cause to issue an inspection warrant exists if these neutral criteria "are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. 
Limitations on the Scope of Administrative Searches.
Although the administrative warrant issues on less than probable cause, it was fashioned to protect other "traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual" through the warrant requirement. 7 7 Thus, the scope of the search is limited to areas for which a showing of probability has been force against the citizen." Frank v. Maryland made; 78 a neutral magistrate must narrowly draw the scope of the warrant authorizing that search;" and the areas implicated and violations alleged must be described with particularity in the warrant. 80 The Secretary, then, is incorrect in arguing that warrants need only be "restricted to the subject matter regulated by the statute and other limitations imposed by Congress." 81 The constitutionally permissible scope of a search is defined not by an agency's regula- 78 Camara noted that the warrant should be "suitably restricted," id. at 539, and included "the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search" as a matter for review by the magistrate, id. at 532. See LaFave, supra note 56, at 25-26. The Court in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), analogized such warrants to administrative subpoenas, which must be "sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome." Id. at 544 (footnote omitted). See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) ("relevancy and adequacy or excess in the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes, and scope of the inquiry"). tory authority but by the locale-specific probability provided by its investigatory scheme. 2 Areas not implicated by the scheme are outside this showing of probability and may not be searched.
The often wall-to-wall scope of section 8(a) programmed inspections" is fully consistent with these principles. The breadth of such searches is justified by the administrative plan, which establishes the requisite likelihood that violations will be found. 8 Because the hazards addressed in a programmed inspection plan often include the full spectrum of violations and dangers set forth in the Act, sufficient probability to search may exist throughout a facility." 5 82 The Secretary's argument would confine the magistrate's role to ensuring that the warrant does not exceed the inspector's statutory authority, an interpretation that would reduce his function to proofreading the statute as reprinted in the warrant. As Justice Stevens pointed out in arguing against the warrant requirement, such a reading renders both magistrate and warrant superfluous, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 333 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and ignores the Court's declaration in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) , that "broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review." In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967), the Court found "strong support in [its administrative] subpoena cases for our conclusion that warrants are a necessary and tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises," and it noted that the protections provided by an administrative subpoena are "constitutionally sufficient" if the inquiry is within the agency's authority, the demand is not too indefinite, and the information sought is reasonably relevant. See also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Comment, supra note 63, at 78-85. 83 See note 34 supra.
8 See text and notes at notes 74-76 supra. Although the case law remains confused and in a state of flux, it has been generally held that the applicant must provide data demonstrating the prevalence of hazards within an industry. See In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1977 ), af'd, 587 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978 Cir. 1979) . A particular worksite within the industry must be selected on a rational, nondiscriminatory basis to ensure that it "was selected for inspection not as the result of the 'unbridled discretion' of a field agent," but on the basis of neutral criteria. In re Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335 , 1343 (7th Cir. 1979 . The standard selection scheme is "worst-first." 9 0cc. Safety & Health Rep. 533 (1979) . See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195, 200-01 (W.D. Va. 1977) . The ranking of the worksite on the worst-first list may not be disregarded without justification. Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474, 483-84 (D.N.J. 1978) . 85 It also has been argued that " [b] ecause the exact location of violations cannot be known prior to entering the establishment,. based on a different genre of probability, confined to particular areas, and raise serious problems of intrusiveness and abuse not implicated by programmed inspections. Because of these distinctions, a greater quantum of probability is required before an area can be inspected in a complaint search.
1. Probable Cause. A complaint inspection rests on a showing of probability altogether different from that made for a programmed inspection. The magistrate is presented not with an objective administrative plan addressing a variety of possible hazards, but only with allegations of a particular violation or danger. 2 Whereas a plan implicates an entire facility, the complaint designates a specific location. 3 By providing "specific evidence '9 4 of the existence of a violation, the complaint establishes a high level of strictly localized probability clearly sufficient to justify investigation of the alleged hazard. 9 5 Similarly, if the alleged viola-92 Vague, general descriptions do not justify a broad search; to the contrary, they fail to establish probable cause at all. See In re ASARCO, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 350, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1981 ) (complaint alleged "poor housekeeping"; "The issuance of a wall-to-wall warrant on such general allegations would render meaningless the warrant requirement. . . ."). Moreover, if the Secretary does find reasonable grounds to inspect hazards other than those alleged on the face of the complaint, he must specify the additional targets for inspection. Conclusory statements that "it is also reasonable to believe that other violations besides those described may exist" are insufficient. For a discussion of the degree of particularity required in identifying the location of the alleged hazards, see BP Oil, Inc. v. Marshall, 509 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (although holding that the identity of the violation must be described with particularity, the court reserved the question of the relationship between the violation and the area implicated). See also J.R. Simplot Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1981 ) (reasonable and good faith effort to identify the location of the hazard required), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1981) . The proper standard would require particular description of the violation's location as a corollary to the description of the hazard and of the area for which probable cause has been shown.
" Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) ; see also Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 103 (10th Cir. 1981) ("The warrant application must ... inform the magistrate of the substance of the complaint so that he can determine whether the alleged conditions, if true, constitute a violation.") (citation omitted).
"5 The level of probability approaches criminal probable cause, but should not be held tion has manifestations elsewhere, the complaint also may provide an adequate level of probability for the search of those areas." Finally, the complaint may supply Camara-level probability that a search of similar areas in the facility would reveal similar violations2.
As to all other areas of the establishment, however, the complaint fails to supply even Camara-level probability. The complaint cannot justify a search for violations it does not allege in areas it does not mention." Neither the quantity, nor the location, Point-Pepperell, Inc., v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178 , 1183 (N.D. Ga. 1980 98 It has been argued that the complaint gives "probable cause to believe that a particular workplace is not entirely safe. " Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1325 (7th Cir. 1980 (Sprecher, J.) . Probability that one hazard exists, however, does not in itself meet the fourth amendment's particularity and probable cause requirements as to other violations in other areas. This "tip of the iceberg" assumption "is indeed approval of general warrants in every conceivable case." Id. at 1327 (Wood, J., dissenting) . nor the type of violations alleged" legitimately support an inference that violations not complained of will be found in undetailed locations. 100 2. Intrusiveness. Like the investigatory fire searches considered in Tyler, OSHA complaint inspections must be subjected to "more particularized inquiry" by the magistrate. 1 0 1 The intrusiveness and potential for abuse of complaint inspections require a new balance to be struck between "the need for the intrusion on the one hand, and the threat of disruption to the occupant on the mem. op. at 2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1979) ). But employees in other areas may be expected to complain and to be equally aware of their right to do so.
To justify a broader search, OSHA therefore at least must show "that where violations of [this] type ... are found to exist it is probable that other ... violations exist in other parts of" such facilities. Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 476 F. Supp. 698, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1979 ), afrd, 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980 . See note 24 supra. Simply to contend that "OSHA inspectors executing a limited warrant will probably observe conditions that would lead them to suspect other violations," Marshall v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719, 720 (8th Cir. 1979) , or that "agency experience indicates that complaint inspections result in the discovery of at least as many hazards not related to the complaint as are related to the complained-of working conditions," OSHA INSTRUCTION CPL 2.12A § K, reprinted in 1979 "The quantity of alleged violations, e.g., Marshall v. Berwick Forge & Fabricating Co., 474 F. Supp. 104, 112-13 (M.D. Pa. 1979 ) (170 alleged violations justified wall-to-wall search); Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977 ) (80 alleged violations; limited warrant issued); the location of those violations in the facility, e.g., Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1326 (7th Cir. 1980 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring) (violations were "sufficiently diffuse" to justify wall-to-wall search); In re ASARCO, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 350, 352 (N.D. Tex. 1981 ) (Secretary argued that alleged violations were "so pervasive and covered so much of the work place as to provide probable cause to believe that violations existed throughout the refinery"); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 476 F. Supp. 698, 706-07 (M.D. Pa. 1979 ) (complaints may be "so pervasive" as to justify wall-to-wall search), afl'd, 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980) ; and the total area of the facility implicated by the alleged violations, e.g., Marshall v. Berwick Forge & Fabricating Co., 474 F. Supp. 104, 112-13 (M.D. Pa. 1979 ) (wall-to-wall search justified where 300,000 square feet, 15% of the workplace, were implicated), in themselves give inadequate cause to believe that hazards exist in unmentioned locations. See note 98 supra. To argue that because the search is broad it should be broader is inconsistent with the requirement that government intrusions on privacy be as narrow as possible. See text and notes at notes 55-59, 78-80 supra.
100 It has been argued that to require a showing of probable cause for each part of the employer's facility "would render meaningless the Supreme Court pronouncement in Barlow's that the Secretary's 'entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises'...." In re Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335 , 1344 (7th Cir. 1979 ) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978 ). Reference to the context of this quotation, however, shows that it referred to "[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense." 436 U.S. at 320.
101 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978) . See text and notes at notes 86-91 supra.
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As in Tyler, OSHA complaint inspections are not programmatic, but responsive to individual events. 03 Employees and union representatives may make complaints to harass employers. 04 The participation of these parties in the actual inspection' 05 may be exploited to pressure the inspector to exceed the proper bounds of his search. Moreover, the procedure remains open to harassing administration by OSHA officials themselves. 1 06 Because the inspection is a response to allegations of specific wrongdoing, the inspec-101 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978 . In that case, the union filed two imminent danger complaints during a strike, then later "sent a telegram to OSHA advising it that the strike had ended and that [the union] wanted to withdraw [its] complaints against BP." Id. at 805. OSHA nevertheless insisted on continuing its investigation and met with the union to draft a "revised list of hazards." Id. In another case, the employer was inspected 23 times while comparable establishments were inspected no more than 3 times. The majority of these inspections were prompted by employee complaints, and on those occasions when the complaints were groundless, the inspectors were "forced by union members to investigate other situations" until eventually some violation was discovered. In a letter to the Assistant Secretary, the employer pleaded that the union "had found OSHA to be a convenient tool in a program of harassment in an effort to obtain concessions which have no relation to safety and health." Nevertheless, the union called for inspectors a twenty-fourth time, and they arrived demanding entry to make a wall-to-wall search. Dravo Corp. (employer alleged that his insistence that OSHA obtain a warrant prompted the agency to convert the inspection into a wide-ranging search resulting in "a host of non-serious, nitpicking citations").
Political pressure also may provoke improper inspections. When questioned about excessive inspections, one area director explained that "if he did not promptly service certain of these complaints, he might, and often did, get pressure from people in political life, including Congressmen, to make greater effort." Dravo Corp. tors enter with suspicions aroused against the particular employer, leading to a "hostile" search that is "personal in nature." 1 0 The broad discretion allowed in programmed inspections is likely to be abused where inspectors entering in pursuit of evidence of alleged hazards are permitted to extend the scope of their searches. 108 In short, despite statutory safeguards, 10 9 the focused, hostile nature of 107 Camara .v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 537 (1967) . 108 The need for a check is apparent: on the basis of limited complaints, OSHA has asserted the right not only to inspect literally "wall-to-wall," but also to inspect every building and yard in a seventy-acre establishment, Marshall v. North Am. Car. Co., 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980) (1979) . The probable cause requirement guards against fishing expeditions, however, only if the search is restricted to those areas for which probable cause is shown. If the magistrate need only determine whether there is probable cause to enter a facility and does not limit the scope of the search within that facility, the officer's discretion remains unchecked. The inspectors have no more right to wander if they enter on probable cause limited to one area than if they enter with consent limited to one area. See, e.g., Stephenson Enterprises, Inc. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021 , 1024 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1978 109 Although proclaiming that it "of course does not intend to be used as a harassment device," 45 FED. REG. 65,916, 65,922 (1980) , OSHA in practice has disregarded each of the statutory safeguards discussed in note 29 supra. The agency has instructed that administrators "shall conduct a thorough evaluation of all complaints, regardless of the complaint's formality." FIELD MANUAL, ch. VI, § E.l.a, reprinted in 1981 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REF.
FILE (BNA) 77:2701. Thus it has inspected on the basis of complaints from competitors and former employees, see note 39 supra, groups that have no direct contact with the hazards they allege and that are likely to be motivated more by ill will than by concern for the safety of others. OSHA has even acted on anonymous telephone complaints. E.g., In re Quality Prods., 6 0cc. Safety & Health Cas. (BNA) 1663 (D.R.I. 1978) . OSHA also will respond to complaints setting forth merely "a violation of the Act," 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11(a) (1981), including violations of standards not threatening physical harm and violations of the General Duty Clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976) . The opportunities for harassment are multiplied by the over 5,000 "consensus" safety standards, "many of them trivial and unrelated to actual workplace hazards," pursuant to which compliance officers, "lacking the latitude to the complaint inspection and the potential for private vendettas combine to produce grave risks of abuse. 110 The Camara balancing test therefore requires a higher level of probability to justify the intrusion.
3. Opposing Arguments. The Secretary has argued, however, that "expediency dictates" a search broader than the allegations in the complaint because a wall-to-wall search is the most efficient use of limited compliance resources. 1 Extending a complaint inspection wall-to-wall is a perverse method of conserving scarce resources, however. 121 The assertion that the fourth amendment should be applied in light of the Act's remedial purposes 122 is similarly flawed. Remedial motives "cannot supply probable cause, even under the most flexible standard, where it does not otherwise exist. Finally, it has been argued that it is "anomalous" to restrict the scope of an OSHA inspection when evidence of specific violations exists, while allowing wall-to-wall searches when the agency has no evidence of violations. 24 In that the narrower scope results from the more localized showing of probability, there is no paradox.
1 25 With regard to the more stringent requirement of probability imposed when OSHA acts on "specific evidence of an existing violation, ' an anomaly undeniably exists. To challenge it, though, is to challenge the basic premise underlying the administrative warrant: that the probability demanded by the warrant
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OSHA Complaint Inspections clause varies in proportion to the intrusiveness of the proposed search. 2 7 Narrowing the scope of the potentially abusive and harassing complaint inspection is neither more nor less anomalous than allowing a programmed inspection to be broader than the highly intrusive criminal search.
4. The Proper Standard of Probable Cause. The proper level of probability necessary to justify a complaint inspection must be determined through the Camara balancing test.' 2 8 In degree of intrusiveness, the complaint inspection resembles a criminal search.' 2 9 Both involve nonroutine and hostile searches for evidence of a suspected violation, and both provide opportunities for harassment. Because the violations sought in the complaint inspection are not criminal,' 3 0 however, a less stringent showing of probability than that required for criminal searches is appropriate.' 3 ' The proper level of probable cause for complaint inspections thus lies between that required for criminal searches and that provided by an administrative plan.
The Supreme Court has identified such a middle ground, labelled "reasonable belief," in its stop-and-frisk cases. 1 " 2 This level of probable cause is endorsed by the Act itself, which requires that the Secretary inspect only if he has "reasonable grounds to believe" the alleged hazard exists." Under the reasonable belief standard, a warrant should issue if the employee's allegations are credible 13 4 and support a reasonable belief that the violation will be found in the place alleged. 5 Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178 , 1182 , 1184 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1980 135 The Tenth Circuit has attempted to formulate a standard of probable cause for complaint inspections that appears to be less stringent than the "reasonable belief" standard:
[T]o issue a warrant, the magistrate need not have a reasonable belief that a violation will be found. Nor need he even find it more probable than not that a violation will be uncovered .... When the warrant application is grounded not upon conformance with administrative or legislative guidelines but upon "specific evidence" of violations such as an employee complaint, there must be some plausible basis for believing that a violation is likely to be found. Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 102 (10th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original). This standard is too close to the level of probability required of an administrative plan, and it does not sufficiently consider the hostility and potential for harassment of the complaint [49:203
OSHA Complaint Inspections
The search authorized must be limited to investigation of the alleged violations and any elements or manifestations thereof for which reasonable belief exists. 13 6 Evidence of violations garnered outside of this limited scope should be excluded from penalty proceedings.
1 37 Although establishment of an intermediate level of
probability for complaint inspections further complicates administration of the warrant requirement, 1 3 8 such variation is the inevitable result of applying a reasonableness standard to the warrant clause in administrative warrant cases. 1 19
